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Spiegel von https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden.git synchronisiert 2024-05-14 21:10:04 +02:00
vaultwarden/src/api/core/two_factor/protected_actions.rs
Mathijs van Veluw f863ffb89a
Add Protected Actions Check (#4067)
Since the feature `Login with device` some actions done via the
web-vault need to be verified via an OTP instead of providing the MasterPassword.

This only happens if a user used the `Login with device` on a device
which uses either Biometrics login or PIN. These actions prevent the
athorizing device to send the MasterPasswordHash. When this happens, the
web-vault requests an OTP to be filled-in and this OTP is send to the
users email address which is the same as the email address to login.

The only way to bypass this is by logging in with the your password, in
those cases a password is requested instead of an OTP.

In case SMTP is not enabled, it will show an error message telling to
user to login using there password.

Fixes #4042
2023-11-12 22:15:44 +01:00

143 Zeilen
4,4 KiB
Rust

use chrono::{Duration, NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use rocket::Route;
use crate::{
api::{EmptyResult, JsonUpcase},
auth::Headers,
crypto,
db::{
models::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
DbConn,
},
error::{Error, MapResult},
mail, CONFIG,
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![request_otp, verify_otp]
}
/// Data stored in the TwoFactor table in the db
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)]
pub struct ProtectedActionData {
/// Token issued to validate the protected action
pub token: String,
/// UNIX timestamp of token issue.
pub token_sent: i64,
// The total amount of attempts
pub attempts: u8,
}
impl ProtectedActionData {
pub fn new(token: String) -> Self {
Self {
token,
token_sent: Utc::now().naive_utc().timestamp(),
attempts: 0,
}
}
pub fn to_json(&self) -> String {
serde_json::to_string(&self).unwrap()
}
pub fn from_json(string: &str) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let res: Result<Self, crate::serde_json::Error> = serde_json::from_str(string);
match res {
Ok(x) => Ok(x),
Err(_) => err!("Could not decode ProtectedActionData from string"),
}
}
pub fn add_attempt(&mut self) {
self.attempts += 1;
}
}
#[post("/accounts/request-otp")]
async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, mut conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
err!("Email is disabled for this server. Either enable email or login using your master password instead of login via device.");
}
let user = headers.user;
// Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
if let Some(pa) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &mut conn).await
{
pa.delete(&mut conn).await?;
}
let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::new(generated_token);
// Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, pa_data.to_json());
twofactor.save(&mut conn).await?;
mail::send_protected_action_token(&user.email, &pa_data.token).await?;
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
struct ProtectedActionVerify {
OTP: String,
}
#[post("/accounts/verify-otp", data = "<data>")]
async fn verify_otp(data: JsonUpcase<ProtectedActionVerify>, headers: Headers, mut conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
err!("Email is disabled for this server. Either enable email or login using your master password instead of login via device.");
}
let user = headers.user;
let data: ProtectedActionVerify = data.into_inner().data;
// Delete the token after one validation attempt
// This endpoint only gets called for the vault export, and doesn't need a second attempt
validate_protected_action_otp(&data.OTP, &user.uuid, true, &mut conn).await
}
pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
otp: &str,
user_uuid: &str,
delete_if_valid: bool,
conn: &mut DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
let pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
.await
.map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
pa_data.add_attempt();
// Delete the token after x attempts if it has been used too many times
// We use the 6, which should be more then enough for invalid attempts and multiple valid checks
if pa_data.attempts > 6 {
pa.delete(conn).await?;
err!("Token has expired")
}
// Check if the token has expired (Using the email 2fa expiration time)
let date =
NaiveDateTime::from_timestamp_opt(pa_data.token_sent, 0).expect("Protected Action token timestamp invalid.");
let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time() as i64;
if date + Duration::seconds(max_time) < Utc::now().naive_utc() {
pa.delete(conn).await?;
err!("Token has expired")
}
if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) {
pa.save(conn).await?;
err!("Token is invalid")
}
if delete_if_valid {
pa.delete(conn).await?;
}
Ok(())
}